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Virtual Population Units: A New Institutional




University of Rhode Island
Abstract   This paper describes an alternative, rights-based approach to the
economic problems of fisheries management and governance. The approach is
based on the concept of a Virtual Population (VP), which provides an alterna-
tive way to define use rights in a fishery management system. Included is a
comparison of harvest rates under the VP regime, “sole-owner,” and open-ac-
cess regimes. In comparison, a VP solution is more efficient than open access
and can approach that of a sole owner. More importantly, in our opinion, the
approach contains a higher degree of local control over issues such as concen-
tration of ownership and, unlike some community-based systems, provides an
explicit, decentralized incentive for conservation. It also contains a built-in in-
centive mechanism for end-of-year conservation that is absent from individual
transferable quotas (ITQs).
Key words   Virtual populations, virtual population units, ITQs, marginal valua-
tion.
JEL Classification Codes   Q220, Q590, C720, D830.
Introduction
Fishery economics plays a significant role in proposing management policies to im-
prove the economic efficiency of a fishery and can finesse some of the distributional
concerns of fishing communities, even if there may be some loss of economic effi-
ciency relative to that of an unattainable ideal. This study compares fishers’ harvest
patterns under a Virtual Population (VP) regime with those under sole ownership
and open-access regimes. These comparisons are made because they are conven-
tional reference points. Specifically, the sole-ownership regime is considered the
“Gold Standard” of fisheries economics, while the open-access regime illustrates the
case for intervention. Both these reference points are, of course, unrealistic since
most fisheries fall somewhere between the two. However, there are many intermedi-
ate possibilities, and the choice between imperfect possibilities involves much more
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than ordinal measures of efficiency. Fishers are often hostile to policies based solely
on economic efficiency, and fishery managers find it difficult to reach a consensus
among disparate groups of fishermen. Because of the governance implications, an
alternative institution may be more acceptable to fishers. One such institution may
be a VP and its “sole-owner,” termed a Virtual Population Unit (VPU).1 Such a sys-
tem assigns exclusive use rights to groups of fishers and provides a strong feedback
incentive for conservation investments.
Sole Ownership and Virtual Populations
A paper by Gavaris (1996) provides a basis for imagining a continuum from sole
ownership to community-based management via appropriately defined use rights.
Using the term “partial populations” he imagined “Population Stewardship Rights”
(PSR) for a fishery system. His paper did not develop the concept algebraically, so
much of what follows is our interpretation and extrapolation of his basic ideas. The
key concept is one of accounting via “partial populations.” His choice of the phrase
“partial populations” is descriptive of his implicit biological model (dynamic pool)
in which each age class is a “partial population.” Partial population is a less descrip-
tive term when a surplus production model is used. Furthermore, his emphasis was
on biological concepts rather than human behavior. A better phrase, in our opinion,
is “Virtual Populations”(VPs), because it expresses the abstract accounting nature of
the concept rather than focusing on the various age classes.
In this VP/VPU institutional structure, exclusive access to a portion of a popula-
tion is delegated to the care of fishermen or groups. A VP is a shadow of a real
population. Accounting procedures enable humans to create an artificial firm on pa-
per to measure and monitor the flow of funds through real firms. Similarly, a VP is
an accounting unit that can be scaled arbitrarily. A legal entity (individual, port, re-
gion, etc.) is given sole right to manage its own VP. A VPU is a sole owner of access
rights to a VP. This matters because the VPU’s incentive structure is based not on
the behavior of everyone, but on its own behavior. The size of a VP is dependent on
the VPU’s initial allocation, subsequent catches, and contribution to growth of the
resource.
The growth of real populations is diffused, via capture, over all fishermen in the
real fishery. Under unregulated open access or a conventional quota management
system, if one fisherman reduces his harvest, the increased stock at a later time pe-
riod belongs not only to the contributing fisherman, but to all other fishermen
including those who deplete their VPs. In this case, other fishermen can benefit from
the increased stock size without paying any additional costs or deferred benefits.
There is an incentive for other fishermen to free ride, and this dilutes individual and
group incentives for conservation. However, for a particular VPU, growth emanating
from its conservation decisions is allocated to its own VP.
In the course of rewriting this paper, we discovered a series of papers by
Townsend (1992, 1995a,b,c). Viewed collectively, these papers assert some of what
is discussed in this paper. However, the approach taken is different, the connections
are not explicitly developed, and there are some technical issues associated with
growth accounting that are not discussed in Townsend’s work. Townsend also uses
Gavaris’ (1996) focus on partial populations and regulating harvest rates of each age
class; a focus that leads the reader to suppose the approach is inextricably linked to
1 This institution involving VPs and VPUs has no connection with the “virtual population” analysis used
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regulating the exploitation rate by age class. We think the silence that has greeted
the partial populations idea is undeserved and has to do, at the least partially, with
its implications of being poorly understood. We hope that using the adjective “vir-
tual,” instead of “partial,” will help understanding. Also, specialization and division
of labor in the social sciences may have lessened the attractiveness of a conceptual
bridge, which helps to connect the disparate viewpoints of efficiency versus commu-
nity-based advocates in fisheries management. We will try to connect these threads
in due course, beginning with an explanation of a VP and a VPU. We find the great-
est difficulty among readers is an unnecessarily concrete interpretation of a “fish
stock.” We seek to break through this rigidity by deliberately defining an abstract
“virtual” population. Obviously, dividing a real population is hard to imagine; not so
a virtual one. To close the circle, we demonstrate numerically that calculations from
virtual populations can conserve a real one. This demonstration is not intended as a
proof that a VPU regime will necessarily work. It is, rather, a demonstration that it
could work under conventional self-interest behavioral assumptions.
Management with Virtual Population Units
The basic VP model starts with the assumptions of perfect information, no uncer-
tainty, and no biological and production interdependency. These assumptions are
also standard in the case of sole ownership of the entire resource.2 While unrealistic,
these assumptions simplify the exposition. We have also found that it is easier to be-
gin from the simplest case because it is well understood. A sole owner has exclusive
property rights for own stock. In the trivial case, the stock is physically separable
into small stocks as in aquaculture. A sole owner’s harvests cause no externality to
any other producer. In this case, the distinction between the virtual and actual re-
source is not even necessary; it is natural to suppose they are the same. In a later
section, a more complex case with biological and production interdependency will
be presented. For simplicity and brevity, it is assumed that least cost input propor-
tions within each VPU are always attained. This assumption is made because the
problem of input stuffing is well known and we have nothing to add to it. However,
we believe that under a VPU system, the focus on incentives, peer pressure, and the
smaller size of a VPU make efficient input proportions more likely than in the ab-
sence of such a system.
A Separable Fishery Model
The simplest model has stocks that are physically separable and abstracts from bio-
logical and production interdependency. Such a fishery is analogous to an idealized
aquaculturist with complete property rights and exclusivity of other fishermen due
to physical separation and territorial rights on farms.3
2 Since a fish stock is common pool resource, an individual fisherman’s production affects other
fishermen’s production. The stock is not separable into sub stocks corresponding to groups of fishermen
(VPUs).
3 An idealized aquaculturist has certainty and full information of harvest amount since the owner plans
the amount of harvest according to the own profit function. Since an idealized aquaculturist has tenure
security, full information, no biological or harvest interdependency, and complete private property
rights, each aquaculturist is a sole owner, and individual stock change is affected by an individual
growth function and harvest rate. A colleague, whose opinion we respect, suggested this well-known
case as an introduction to the more complex case.Lee and Gates 32
In this simplest case, the resource population can be partitioned into indepen-
dent components; i.e.:







Hh i i = Â , (3)
where hi = aeixi denotes individual harvest at time t, xi denotes the biomass of the
fish stock at time t, gi denotes growth rate of ith stock,4 ei denotes ith fishing effort, a
denotes catchability coefficient, and X and H are aggregate analogs of xi and hi, re-
spectively. For brevity, we omit the time subscript unless needed for clarity.
Each partitioned population unit has a sole owner (individuals or groups of co-
operating individuals), and harvest behavior depends on own fishing effort and
stock; i.e., there is no biological or harvest interdependency. Then, each partitioned
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where pi denotes the profit function for the ith sole owner, p denotes price of unit
harvest, and d = interest rate.
In this fishery, a sole owner approach to management would provide maximum
resource rents, cost-effective harvest costs, and optimal resource conservation.
There is neither a race-to-fish nor input stuffing, and there are no gear conflicts or
market gluts.
A Common Pool Fishery and Virtual Population
In this more complex case, the fish stock is a common pool resource, since fish are
mobile and property rights for fish are not well defined. Stock growth rate depends
on the total stock size, and the stock has a biological interdependency since it is not
separable into sub-stocks corresponding to groups of fishermen.
Since the fish stock is not separable and has biological and production interde-
4 A simple logistic growth function is assumed.VPUs—A New Approach 33
pendency, it is not feasible to separate the stock and assign sole ownership to it. There is
joint production from the resource stock according to the production function:
ha e X ii = . (5)
In addition, the stock exhibits mixing, so a physical partitioning of the real stock
among resource users/harvesters is not feasible; there is no way to disaggregate X
into individual xi. However, by introducing the accounting concept of a VP, it is fea-
sible to separate the mobile stock and assign it to any legal entity, such as fishing
communities or an industry sector and to relax the assumptions in the preceding sec-
tion in which no biological and production interdependency were assumed. To this
end, a useful construct is a VPU whereby each “owner” (VPU) has a VP, vi, defined
as follows:






















where V = X which is required for accounting purposes, and vi denotes ith VPU’s
share of the aggregate VP at time t; X denotes aggregate actual population at time t;
si(0) = ith VPU’s share of the initial aggregate virtual population;5 G[V(0)] = aggre-
gate growth function evaluated at initial time 0; Dt0G = G[V(t)] – G[V(0)] = change
in aggregate growth rate change, time t versus initial time; Dt0vi = vi(t) – vi(0) =
change in ith VPU’s virtual stock; time t vs time 0; Dt0V = V(t) – V(0) = change in
aggregate virtual stock; time t vs time 0.
Note the use of Dt0 to denote the use of a tth order difference; Dt0X denotes X(t) –
X(0). D30X denotes X(3) – X(0).
Under the assumption of perfect information and no stochastic events, the sum
of individual VPs is equal to the aggregate VP and to aggregate actual population
[equation (6)].6
Suppose each VPU maximizes own profits as follows:
Maximize p d
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subject to: equation of motion (7); initial virtual stock vi(0) = vi0; consistency re-
quirement of equation (6) and non-negativity, vi, gi ≥ 0, all i and t. The aggregate
equation of motion for the real population is: dX/dt =  X  = G(X) – H, where aggre-
gate real growth: G(X) = G (V).
5 The coefficient s is, in Townsend’s (1995a) terminology, a “fractional share.” We introduced these be-
fore reading his paper but the fractional shares approach also has behavioral advantages as discussed by
Townsend. His assertions about the political economy of “fractional licensing” also seem applicable
here.
6 Stochastic events can pose problems for any management regime, including a VP regime. Finding ways
to deal with uncertainty is not fundamentally different here than, for example, a sole owner regime. Pe-
riodic recalibration is necessary in both cases. To the extent that uncertainty raises the implicit discount
rate, the optimal harvest rate is also affected. We return to this point in our concluding remarks.Lee and Gates 34
Since there is a biological interdependency and the aggregate growth function is
non-linear, an individual VP’s growth function cannot be calculated simply by di-
viding the aggregate growth rate according to the initial ratio of stock assignment.
The following section develops the growth equation for a representative VPU and its
contribution to aggregate growth. This is a point where the verbal discussion by both
Townsend (1992, 1995a,b,c) and Gavaris (1996) is uninformative. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that VPU1 conserves and allows its VP to recover, while VPU2 depletes its virtual
population. The change in the real population depends on the relative magnitudes of the
actions taken by the two VPUs. Are both to be given the same growth rate? We think
not. If incentives are to be effective, they must reflect the different choices made by
the two VPUs. The growth accounting must reflect the actual conservation decisions
of the participating VPUs. This is critical to a decentralization of incentives.
Virtual Population Growth
Carrying capacity is the maximum biomass that the environment can attain and is
denoted as K. The intrinsic growth rate for the stock is denoted as r. V(0) is the ini-
tial aggregate virtual population, and vi is the ith VPU’s share of which must also satisfy
equation (6). Initial VPs can be decided in the same ways individual quotas (IQs) or in-
dividual transferable quotas (ITQs) are allocated by a rule, such as historical harvests. G
is the aggregate growth rate at time t, and G increases as the aggregate virtual popu-
lation, V, increases if V is smaller than the half of the carrying capacity, K:
GX GV r V
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VP growth is given by equation (7) which, on multiplying by Dt0V, may also be writ-
ten as (10):
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Equations (10) and (10a) are equivalent, but (10) is preferred for numerical model-
ing in which one or more elements may approach zero during an iterative
procedure.7 Equation (10a) partitions the growth of a VP into its “initial growth en-
dowment,” si(0)G[V(0)] , plus a growth increment or decrement, Dt0G, that reflects
own contribution to aggregate cumulative growth, weighted by its share of cumula-
tive stock change, (Dt0vi/Dt0V) . After initial time, a VPU continues to receive the
“initial endowment” of growth, si(0)G[V(0)], plus a fraction of aggregate growth
change, Dt0G = G[V(t)] – G[V(0)]. The fraction received depends on the ratio of own
cumulative conservation success to aggregate conservation success. This institu-
7 We are not suggesting that zero growth is optimal; only that it is unwise to structure a numerical model
in a form which invites explosive calculations. Numerical optimization methods involve iterative calcu-
lations in which a (near) singularity may arise.VPUs—A New Approach 35
tional rule may seem unnecessarily complicated, but, in fact, it leads to simple con-
straints on state variables in a mathematical programming representation.
Virtual populations vary over time according to the harvest decisions of the in-
dividual VPUs and the contributions of each to the aggregate change in growth rate
at the current time, t, compared to the initial growth rate. An increase in own virtual
population is reallocated only to the VPU that increases own VP. In the real world
fishery, it is not feasible to distinguish individual contributions to the real stock in-
crease. By using VPs, it is possible to reallocate the contribution only to the
contributor. This coincidence of costs and benefits of conservation affects individual
VP size and the incentives for rational behavior. G is affected by V, so G will reflect
cumulative conservation and depletion decisions. Since the sum of individual
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Dt0vi is the difference between the individual initial VP at time t and at time 0. Dt0V
is the difference between the aggregate VP at time t and aggregate initial VP as indi-
cated in equation (7). These cumulative definitions of Dt0vi and Dt0V enable
allocation of cumulative growth or depletion to the VPs whose conservation invest-
ments produce the growth. The growth function is non-linear and cannot be easily
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The growth of the ith VP, denoted by gi, is calculated using equation (10a).8 Because
of this, an individual VP adjusts according to equation (7) in which Dt0G(Dt0vi/Dt0V)
measures the cumulative contribution of the ith VPU to the aggregate cumulative
growth change compared to the initial growth rate. The contribution of an individual
VPU’s harvest decisions to the growth rate increases or decreases own VP for the
next period.
Deterministic Simulation
This section illustrates how a VP/VPU system might work. To this end, suppose
three VPUs make arbitrary, non-optimal harvest decisions during six periods. Calcu-
lations, below, illustrate the consequences for each VP of those harvest decisions.
Later, we will introduce the findings from numerical optimizations using mathemati-
cal programming. Carrying capacity for this stock is K = 1,360,000MT and the
intrinsic growth rate is r = 0.8. The initial aggregate growth rate, G(V), is
255,000MT at the aggregate initial virtual population of V(0) = 510,000MT.9
The arbitrary harvesting scenarios illustrate the calculations involved in ac-
counting for the growth or decline of VPs by individual VPU harvests (figure 1).
8 Neither Gavaris (1996) nor Townsend (1992, 1995a,b,c ) cover this point. In effect, a VPU receives
two initial allocations; a stock allocation and a growth allocation: (a) s0(0)G[V(0)] and (b) s0(0)X(0).
9 G[V(0)] = 0.8*510*(1-510/1360) = 255. The parameter values shown are from the Northwest Atlantic
herring fishery. This is a fact not especially germane to the paper, but one the reader should be aware of.Lee and Gates 36
VPU1 follows the initial harvest level (85,000MT) during all time periods. VPU2
harvests more than the initial harvest level, and VPU3 harvests less than initial har-
vest level.10 VPU1’s virtual population does not change over time since the arbitrary
constant harvest was chosen to do this. VPU2’s virtual population decreases its over-
exploiting behavior. Even though the aggregate VP after time period 3 is smaller
than the aggregate initial VP in the right figure, VPU3’s virtual population is greater
than its initial VP because of its conservation behavior (figure 1, right panel).
Stochastic Considerations
Successful implementation of VPs in real-world fisheries depends on the accuracy
of VPs for the real population. VPs are a representation of a real population in the
same way that accounting represents the financial flows of real firms. If there is a
huge discrepancy between the VP and real population, VPs do not represent real
populations any longer, requiring periodic recalibration of VPs.
There are stochastic factors in most fisheries, as in most industries. There also
can be misreporting and underreporting of actual harvests. Both stochastic events
and inaccurate reporting of catches can cause errors in population calculations.
When there is a significant difference between the VP and the real population, vi can
be adjusted to the real population according to the ratio of the individual virtual
population for the time period. Total real population, X, can be used for the indi-
vidual virtual population, vi, according to the ratio of individual virtual population,
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10 The sum of initial harvest levels is set to be equal to the initial aggregate growth rate for the steady-
state condition.
Figure 1.  Harvests (left) and Changes in VPs (right)VPUs—A New Approach 37
Equation (13) could be used for bridging the possible discrepancy between the VPs
and real population using the ratio of individual VPs from the aggregate VP. Ad-
justed individual VP at time t is vi = siX. This adjustment is equivalent to restarting
the process with new initial conditions at time t.11 This is a neutral adjustment in the
sense that while each VPU is accountable for the depletion or conservation that it
causes, the penalty or reward assigned to VPUs is proportional to their depletion or
conservation. The need for recalibration is assumed to arise from exogenous events
rather than from more sinister inferences. Note that this presumes an effective en-
forcement and compliance regime for harvests. More elaborate recalibration rules
can be devised, but may be extremely controversial.
Fisheries and the Shadow Value of Resources
Without rights-based management, fishers are not assured a predictable share of the
total allowable catch (TAC) and are inclined to harvest competitively. This causes
problems such as appropriation externalities and technological externalities.12 Indi-
vidual fishers’ harvests subtract from the residual fish available to others. This
subtraction lowers the marginal product of additional fishing effort and increases the
marginal costs of harvesting additional fish. Thus, the increased cost of harvesting
due to reducing the available fish stock affects not only the fishers who harvested
the fish, but also all fishers who fish that stock.
Sole access to a VP is reserved for fishers in the associated VPU. However, an
externality still exists. Even though each VPU has its own VP, catch per unit effort
(CPUE) still depends on the aggregate stock size. Although rights are incomplete,
individual VPUs have a high degree of control over own VP, and each VPU’s contri-
bution to the aggregate growth rate is evaluated and credited (or debited) where it is
due. As mentioned before, this sharply penalizes a VPU if the it depletes its own VP
below the initial stock size. Furthermore, an individual VPU’s marginal valuation of
resources is greater than that of an individual fisher under an open-access fishery.
With a greater marginal valuation of the stock, individual VPUs are expected to har-
vest more slowly than individual fishers in an unregulated fishery (see below). How
important this residual problem is can be determined on a case-by-case basis using
numerical methods.
Arnason (1990) compared the resource shadow value between optimal and un-
regulated fisheries. This section discusses the resource shadow value under three
management regimes: sole owner, VP, and an unregulated fishery. The sole owner’s
problem and that of the unregulated individual fisher follow Arnason’s proof in
“Minimum information management in fisheries.”
Suppose N fishers exploit a single stock of fish, X, and have identical log-linear
production functions with unitary partial elasticities:
h q e X ae X i N ii i === º (, ) ; ,, , . 12
11 The problem of recalibration increases uncertainty, but is common to most fishery management re-
gimes, including a sole owner regime. We presume that safe minimum standards on VPs would be in-
cluded as a fail safe measure.
12 Appropriation externalities arise because fishers subtract fish from a common stock without taking
into account the effects of their harvest upon each other. Technological externalities (crowding phenom-
ena) arise when fishers physically interfere with each other in harvesting, such as gear conflicts
(Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).Lee and Gates 38
To simplify the notation, redundant functional subscripts are suppressed below. We
continue to denote total real stock as X, and individual virtual stock (VP) is denoted
as vi. Total growth rate is denoted as G, and growth share for individual VPU is indi-
cated in equation (7). The cost functions are:
c(ei) i = 1,2, ,N; where c(.) is increasing and strictly convex in effort, ei.
As before, p and d represent the market price of catch and the discount rate, respec-
tively.
Optimal Fishing Problem
The stylized problem for the fishery manager or social planner is to maximize the
present value of the profits of all fishers in the fishery with respect to fishing effort.
An individual fisher is required to take account of their own direct costs and the cost
imposed upon other users of the resource stock:
Maximize NeX p ed t i
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initial condition, X(0) = 
0 X
E = Nei = aggregate effort; N = number of firms.
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is:
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For each of the identical fishers, the first-order conditions involve choosing the
level of effort, E(=Nei), for all fishers so that an optimal condition is HE = 0:
pq c q p q c EE E E E -- = - = mm 0o r( ) , (16)
where m represents the current shadow price of an additional unit of stock along the
optimal time path. Along this path, the net marginal benefit of effort is the marginal
benefit of selling fish at the market price less the imputed shadow price of stock.
This net marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of effort.
The co-state condition for the movement of the shadow value along the optimal
path is  ˙ : md m -= - HX
˙ () . md m m -= - -¢ - [] Npq G X Nq XX (17)
The equilibrium solution of these equations is found by setting the growth rate equal
to the total harvest, G(X) = Nq(ei, X). In the equilibrium  ˙ . m=0  The shadow value of










The shadow value of stock depends on the harvest function, stock growth function,
market price of catch, and the discount rate.
Unregulated Individual Fisher’s Problem
The problem faced by the individual fisher who shares the fishery is different to the
extent that each is concerned only with private costs and benefits. An individual
fisher takes account of own direct costs, but not the cost imposed on other users of
the resource. Since an individual fisher does not benefit from taking account of the
costs imposed on other users, no value is placed on conserving the resource. Each
fisher attempts to maximize own profits given the fishing effort by other fishers.
Arnason (1990) assumes that the fishers behave as if each forms predictions or ex-
pectations concerning the fishing effort of other firms. On these assumptions the
individual fisher attempts to maximize the following:13





s.t. ˙ () (, ) XG XN q e X i =-
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initial condition X(0) = X0
E = Nei aggregate effort; N = number of firms.
The stock constraint includes the fishing effort of all fishers. The current value
Hamiltonian for the problem is:
Hp q e Xc e G XN q e X ii i =- + - ( , ) ( ) [ ( ) ( , )], s (20)
where s is the marginal valuation of the stock to the individual fisher.
The first-order conditions () Hei = 0  are:
pq c q p q c ee e e e ii i i i -- = - = ss 0o r( ) , (21)
which is identical to the first-order conditions in optimal fishing problem with s
substituted in the place of m. Equation (21) also states that the net marginal benefit
should be equal to its marginal effort costs.
The co-state condition is  ˙ : sd s -= - HX
˙ () . sd s s -= --¢ - [] pq G X Nq XX (22)
13 Levhari and Mirman (1980) provided an example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution and com-
pared the harvest pattern between cooperative and non-cooperative management.Lee and Gates 40











Individual VPUs have exclusive right to exploit their own VP. Even though there is
a possibility that CPUE may decrease or increase according to the harvest behavior
of other VPUs, individual VPs are mainly controlled by the associated VPU. There
is a sole access right to own a VP and each VPU can defer own harvest, if it chooses
to do so, and receive credit for growth of own VP. Individual VPUs take account of
own direct costs. This section presents the comparative statics of alternative institu-
tional regimes. We do this by examining the steady-state equilibria of each regime
and noting how they differ. Each VPU attempts to maximize its own profits given
the fishing effort by other VPUs.
The ith VPU attempts a conditional maximization of the present value of profits:
Maximize p d
ii
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xi , ei  0 ≥
initial condition xi(0) = xio
E = Nei = aggregate effort; N = number of firms,
where xi = ith VPU
















The harvest behaviors of other VPUs are partially incorporated into the harvest
function and stock constraint.14
The current value Hamiltonian for the problem is:
Hp q e Xc e g Xq e X ii ii =- + - [] (, ) () () (, ) . l (25)
The first-order conditions for each identical VPU are to choose the level of effort, ei,
so that Hei = 0:
pq c q p q c ee e ee ii i i i -- = - = ll 0o r( ) , (26)
14 The harvest function is aeiX, not aeixi, so each CPUE still depends on the total stock size. The growth
function also still contains total stock change Dt0X.VPUs—A New Approach 41
where l is the current shadow price of an additional unit of stock along the optimal
time path. The optimality conditions for the three regimes are expressed by equa-
tions (16), (21), and (26), respectively. All three are equivalent, so the net marginal
benefit is equal to its marginal costs of effort. For a simpler notation, g(X) will be
used below for the growth function of each VPU, gi(X).
The virtual stock transition equation uses the change in individual VPs. How-
ever, the own growth function of a VP is still dependent on the aggregate population
change, and CPUE depends on the aggregate population.
The co-state condition for this problem is  ˙ : ld l -= - HX
˙ [() ] . ld l l -= --¢ - pq g X q XX (27)










Ordinal Comparison of Marginal Valuations
The marginal stock valuations by fishers under different regimes are m = social opti-
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The denominators are d + qXN – G¢(X) £ dN + qX N – g¢(X)N since d £ dN for N > 1,
on the condition that N fishers are identical and have identical VPUs.15 For a typical
homogeneous VPU, the growth function is as follows:
gX g X NGX G N G N i
t
t () () ( ) ( ) ( ) . ==[] += 10 1 0 D (31)
Therefore, g¢(X)N = G¢(X).
Comparing l and s, denominators are d + qX – g¢(X) £ d + qXN – G¢(X), respec-
tively. After canceling out the discount rate, we find:
qg Xq N G X XX - ¢ £- ¢ () () . (32)
15 In numerical modeling we do not require identical VPUs. This flexibility is useful for a management
agency. However, it is extremely difficult to extract general conclusions under heterogeneity because
equilibrium also depends on ancillary assumptions about transferability of assets or harvesting technol-
ogy and unsegmented markets. We will return later to this point.Lee and Gates 42
In steady-state equilibrium, harvest is equal to growth rate:
Nq e X NaeX rX X K rX rX K (, ) ( ) . == -= - 1 2
After canceling out the stock, the remainder is Nae = r – rX/K. Since G¢(X) =
r – 2rX/K = Nae – rX/K and Nae = qXN > G¢(X); therefore, qX – g¢(X) £ qXN – G¢(X)
and l ≥ s.
From equation (29), the marginal valuation of stock is only equal to the socially
optimal valuation when the number of the decision-maker (whether a VPU or fisher-
men), N = 1, that is m = l = s. Otherwise m > l > s for given X and e. Therefore, the
social shadow value of biomass is at least as great as individual VPU’s shadow
value, and the individual VPU’s shadow is also at least as great as the private
shadow price in an unregulated fishery. The equilibrium for the decision-maker may
be characterized as a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, where each decision-maker cor-
rectly predicts the catch of the other fishers and then chooses own optimal harvest
level accordingly.
From the results above, the marginal valuation (l) of stock under a VP regime is
greater than under open access. Fishers under a VP regime value fish stock more
than fishers in an unregulated fishery. The comparison of the marginal valuation
shows fishers under a VP regime harvest more conservatively than fishers in an un-
regulated fishery since individual VPUs have control over their own VP, but not as
completely as a sole owner in an aquaculture case. The results show also that a VP
regime would be less conservative than the social optimum. How much less is a
quantitative question, which cannot be answered with an ordinal analysis such as
that just given.
As shown in the optimal fishing problem, if individual fishers take account of
the resource user cost, depletion is not a problem and the solution is independent of
the number of fishers who have access to the fishery. However, as the history of
world fisheries has shown, individual fishers do not take account of user cost; as the
number of fishers increases, the equilibrium stock declines asymptotically towards
the open-access equilibrium, and the shadow price of the resource to the fishers de-
clines to zero (Hanely, Shogren, and White 1997). Since individual fishers cannot
know the magnitude of impact they impose on stock growth (nor would they take
account of it if they did), they are unlikely to revise their behavior. The VP/VPU in-
stitutional structure provides a framework of accountability, which decentralizes
incentives to the level of individual VPUs.
Numerical Simulations using Mathematical Programming
In an earlier section, arbitrary harvesting scenarios illustrated how a VP/VPU insti-
tutional structure passes the consequences of conservation/depletion decisions back
to the responsible VPU. This section reports the results of some numerical simula-
tions. To do this, the VPU’s problem was formulated as an iterative mathematical
programming problem.16 In this simulation, we did not allow inter-VPU differences
in technical efficiency. Should such differences exist, sales of assets or transfer of
labor and technology may erase the differences over time. However, a collective
agreement among VPU members would presumably be required for asset transfers.
There is a tradeoff here between efficiency and regional benefit distribution. In this
16 We used the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) with the Conopt2 solver.VPUs—A New Approach 43
respect, a VP/VPU system resembles the sectoral allocation systems currently being
proposed in New England (Federal Register 2004).
In iteration 0, each VPU is assumed to hold expectations (randomly chosen by
us) about the harvests of other VPUs. Each VPU then makes conditionally optimal
harvesting decisions for 10 years. The decisions are conditional on the expectations
of behavior of other VPUs. At the end of iteration 0, the conditionally optimal deci-
sions are aggregated and used to revise expectations. Iteration 1 then begins, etc.
After 5–30 iterations, the conditionally optimal decisions matched in the sense that
the sum of squared deviations between expected and conditionally optimal harvest
rates were less than a tolerance factor, so that an approximate Nash-Cournot equilib-
rium had been attained (figure 2).
At this equilibrium, individual VPU harvest rates were the same (as would be
expected for identical VPUs), and aggregate harvest trajectories differed only trivi-
ally from a sole owner solution. This is an indication that the proposed institution
could work quite well. It is not a proof that it necessarily will. Because it is trivially
easy to impose Safe Minimum Standards (SMS) in a mathematical programming
model, lower bounds on stocks and upper bounds on harvest were included. These
proved to be ineffective constraints with zero shadow prices. It is, of course, pos-
sible that they maintained the iterative process within the SMS limits during the
convergence to equilibrium, just as it is common practice for upper or lower bound
primal variables to more narrowly define the policy-relevant search space. In addi-
tion, the existence of such SMS on VPs may, if enforced, reassure all participants
that the regime will work and that expectations can become self fulfilling. Also, the
random initial expectations of each VPU for the harvests by other VPUs were con-
strained to not violate the SMS of the other VPUs. To reiterate, an effective
enforcement and compliance regime is critical. Lacking such SMS, expectations
could be more volatile.
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Optimal Biomass and Fishing Mortality
Figure 3 shows the trajectories of optimal biomass for the sole-owner and VPU in-
stitutions. It will be seen that the two differ trivially. The initial biomass was
deliberately chosen at a relatively low level to see if the VPUs would invest in re-
building their respective VPs.
Figure 4 shows the optimal aggregate fishing mortality trajectory for the sole-
owner and VPU regimes. Under both regimes, it is held at low levels initially while
stock rebuilds, then rises rapidly toward the steady state level.
Concluding Remarks and Discussion
The possibility of fishery management using VPUs has been examined and fishers’
behavioral pattern toward the resource compared under a limited set of alternative
regimes. A comparison of marginal resource valuations illustrated how VPUs would
be expected to exploit more conservatively than individual fishers in an unregulated
fishery. It is sometimes said that if fishers are to address management effectively,
they must first recognize that their actions negatively affect each other. In our expe-
rience, this is an elliptical statement; most fishermen already recognize very well
their effects on each other, but there is insufficient incentive to behave differently.
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We perceive a need for an institutional structure that contains adequate, decentral-
ized incentives for conservation investments. Such incentives may well emerge in a
VP regime as VPUs recognize how their own VP changes according to own and
other fishers’ actions. If VPs are entrusted to communities, it might be easier for
them to interact with each other at a local level leading voluntary collective solu-
tions with their own voluntary enforcement within and among communities.
Another positive aspect of this approach (which Townsend (1992, 1995a,b,c)
also recognized), is that the VP/VPU approach finesses the “year-end” problem un-
der ITQs. The holder of an ITQ is in a position similar to a research grant manager
or a department chair as the year-end approaches. Economic efficiency would sug-
gest a carry-over mechanism. Typically, however, year-end funds (or ITQs) are
“lost” when the new accounting period begins. Obviously, a VP/VPU system is not
the only way to address the problem; we observe merely that it does so automati-
cally. Unfortunately, a VP regime may not be a panacea; there still exists an
externality in a VP system. Even though a VPU has its own VP, CPUE still depends
on the total stock size. This issue is of particular concern if, as seems likely, there
will often be a residual or “exogenous” sector outside the VPU regime. As the rela-
tive size of this exogenous share increases, it seems likely that the incentive for
more conservative behavior may be diminished. This could be especially true if the
“exogenous” sector is not subject to rigorously enforced restrictions on total catch.
A sector allocation regime has some similarity to a VPU regime in that a sector
has a TAC. However, a sector cannot increase its future TAC by harvesting less than
its current TAC. A VPU can do so and, therefore, has an incentive to conserve. Nei-
ther (at present) can a sector decentralize further by creating internal ITQs. The VP/
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VPU approach can be viewed as an alternative pathway to decentralization. If a
VPU chooses to devolve rights internally, several scenarios are obvious. If the basis
for devolution is historical catch shares, the result is IQs or possibly ITQs with full
or restricted transferability allowed by rules chosen by each VPU. If the basis is ef-
fort, the result is individual days at sea or individual transferable days at sea, if
transferability is allowed. The most likely forms of transferability are internal
(within the VPU) and short-term leases, rather than outright rule. If a geographic ba-
sis is used, the result is area-based management, or territorial use rights in fisheries.
If further devolution is not done, the result is similar to community development
quotas but without explicit quotas or to “Sectoral Allocations” but with stronger in-
centives for conservation. Thus, a VPU and its associated VP are quite compatible
with the ideas expressed by Townsend (1995b) in his paper on self-governance. The
VP/VPU concept devolves the fine details of allocation to local levels and can allow
a variety of institutional alternatives as special cases.17 Notice, however, that any le-
gal entity can form a VPU; unanimity of approach among all VPUs is not necessary.
Progress can be made incrementally. If rights are not transferable between VPUs, it
is possible that full economic efficiency will not be attained. However, to the extent that
effort and technology transfers tend to erase differences in technical efficiency, this po-
tential source of economic inefficiency may be attenuated.18 Another source of
heterogeneity is associated with segmented markets. In the Northwest Atlantic herring
fishery, there are inshore-offshore, gear, and market differences which are linked. A
VPU that is organized around purse seine vessels would probably focus on the domestic
bait market. A VPU organized around mid-water trawl gear with onboard refrigerated
seawater systems would be higher cost but would produce a higher quality product
for higher-valued export markets. To further illustrate heterogeneity, the export mar-
ket is much more volatile and depends on cycles in the Northeast Atlantic-Arctic
Ocean herring stocks. Under such conditions, it may well be rational and socially
optimal to deplete stocks somewhat during periods of high export demands. At
present, such heterogeneities fuel economic warfare among the user groups rather
than voluntary exchanges under a rights-based system (Cho and Gates 2002).
We believe that the devolution/decentralization of rule-making authority is very
important for fisheries. The experience with regional (but still highly centralized
rule-making) is often one of stalemate. Decisions require near unanimity among het-
erogeneous groups. Little is resolved until everything is resolved, which is to say,
rarely. A devolution of management such as that enabled via a VP/VPU system does
not imply an abdication of public responsibility for fishery management. The rela-
tionship between a management authority (MA) and VPUs can be contractual; each
VPU enters into a contract with the MA to manage its VP. This raises a myriad of
practical, legal, and administrative questions, which remain to be addressed. Some
of these can draw on general principles for contracts. Others will be peculiar to fish-
eries. Obvious candidates for inclusion are: SMS on each VPU (Ciriacy-Wantrup
1952); provision for adjusting VPs in response to exogenously induced stock fluc-
tuations; closure authority if a VP violates its SMS; and authority of a VPU to
discipline its members for violation of own or MA rules.
While a VP/VPU institutional approach offers the possibility of greater decen-
tralization of decision-making and offers incentives for investing in conservation,
17 Although we have focused on output controls, it is also possible to use the VPU approach in conjunc-
tion with input controls. This may be more attractive in a multispecies fishery.
18 In an echo of the Stolper-Samuelson trade theorem, inefficient VPUs might sell their VP or import
more efficient men and machines. If they are institutionally able to do so but elect not to, the tradeoff
between pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations is made at a local level, which accords well with
American governance concepts and the subsidiary principle of the European Union.VPUs—A New Approach 47
the variability of fisheries makes it uncertain that VPUs would, in fact, be as conser-
vative as we have suggested.19 The same can be said of a sole owner solution in an
uncertain world. In both cases, SMS may be desirable supplements. If monitoring
and enforcement of harvests are inadequate, resource trajectories would become un-
naturally uncertain. For potential incentives to be operative, adequate monitoring
and enforcement of catches would be imperative. The same must be said of other in-
put- and output-based control systems. In principle, the VP/VPU approach could be
used with an input-based control system, but the usual difficulties would apply. It is
likely that catchability coefficients would differ between VPUs so that good data on
catches would still be needed to calibrate the growth of VPs.
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